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BREAKING THE MYTHS: PAIN AND SUFFERING DAMAGE CAPS 
INTRODUCTION 
Your chance of dying due to medical error is one in ten.1  
According to a John Hopkins study, more than 250,000 people in the United 
States die every year because of medical negligence, making it the third leading 
cause of death after heart disease and cancer.2 Whether individual doctors or 
“the system” is to blame, this means nearly ten percent of all deaths are due to 
medical error.3 Further, according to a nationwide survey conducted by the 
National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, twenty-one 
percent of patients report experience with medical errors.4 Therefore, nearly one 
in four patients report an injury due to medical mistake. These medical errors 
often have “lasting impact on the patient’s physical health, emotional health, 
financial well-being, or family relationships.”5 With injury or death due to a 
party’s negligence comes expensive and lengthy litigation. In an effort to lower 
costs, many states have introduced sweeping tort reform against medical 
malpractice options. These reform plans frequently include caps on plaintiffs’ 
noneconomic damages. 
First, this Note examines an overview of noneconomic damages. Next, this 
Note focuses on the constitutionality of noneconomic damage caps. While this 
Note does not go into specifics of the constitutional debate of noneconomic 
damage caps, many other articles have probed the topic.6 The discussion on the 
constitutionality of noneconomic damage caps includes discussions on the 
 
 1. Martin A. Makary & Michael Daniel, Medical error – the third leading cause of death in 
the US, BMJ (May 3, 2016), https://www.bmj.com/content/353/bmj.i2139. 
 2. Study Suggests Medical Errors Now Third Leading Cause of Death in the U.S., JOHNS 
HOPKINS MED. (May 3, 2016), https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/media/releases/study_sug 
gests_medical_errors_now_third_leading_cause_of_death_in_the_us (discussing death rates in the 
United States). 
 3. Id. 
 4. New Survey Finds 21 Percent of Americans Report Personal Experience with Medical 
Errors, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT (Sept. 28, 2017), http://www.ihi.org/about/news/ 
Documents/IHIPressRelease_Patient_Safety_Survey_Sept28_17.pdf. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See, e.g., David F. Maron, Statutory Damage Caps: Analysis of the Scope of Right to Jury 
Trial and the Constitutionality of Mississippi Statutory Caps on Noneconomic Damages, 32 MISS. 
C. L. REV. 109, 110 (2013); Carol J. Miller & Joseph Weidhaas, Medical Malpractice Noneconomic 
Caps Unconstitutional, 69 J. MO. B. 344, 344 (2013); Sue Ganske, Noneconomic Damages Caps 
in Wrongful Death Medical Malpractice Cases - Are They Constitutional?, 14 FLA. ST. U. BUS. 
REV. 31, 32–33 (2015). 
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effects of these caps. As a result, this Note next focuses on the effect of the caps, 
including doctors’ insurance premiums, patients’ insurance premiums, insurance 
profits, physician retention, frivolous lawsuits, and difficulty finding 
representation for those most vulnerable among us. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF NONECONOMIC DAMAGE CAPS 
Noneconomic damages include a variety of compensation types and are 
typically referred to as “pain and suffering” damages. “Serious injuries often 
result in a plaintiff being unable to enjoy the activities he or she was previously 
able to enjoy.”7 This frequently leads to reduced social contact, which can affect 
a plaintiff’s mental health.8 Noneconomic damages are “subjective, non-
monetary, or intangible losses” intended to “make the plaintiff whole” after an 
injury.9 Noneconomic damages encapsulate these less-concrete losses. 
Noneconomic damages include pain and suffering; mental and emotional 
anguish; inconvenience; decreased quality of life; and loss of consortium, 
society, companionship, love, and affection (which a spouse of an injured party 
may claim).10 These damages may also include humiliation and reputational 
damage.11 The lack of direct economic loss and lack of “hard numbers” for 
noneconomic loss (unlike economic damages which have tangible numbers like 
medical bills and lost wages, for example) makes it difficult for juries to assign 
a monetary value to the pain and suffering awards.12 Because of their subjective 
and abstract nature, noneconomic damages have been the subject of tort reform 
in many states.13  
The theory behind noneconomic damage caps was that introducing caps 
would shrink the premiums physicians paid for liability insurance and reduce 
the number of medical malpractice lawsuits. Some claim personal injury and 
medical malpractice lawsuits have caused medical insurance premiums to 
skyrocket within the law few decades.14 To curb these insurance premiums, tort 
reform proponents have introduced and pushed noneconomic damage caps.15 
These caps were also introduced to lower the number of medical malpractice 
lawsuits, which has worked. Annual rates of paid medical malpractice claims 
 
 7. Non-Economic Damages, JUSTIA (Apr. 2018), https://www.justia.com/injury/negligence-
theory/non-economic-damages/ [https://perma.cc/V5QR-V8R6]. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Allyson Fish, Noneconomic Damage Caps in Medical Malpractice Litigation: Finding A 
Solution That Satisfies All Affected Parties, 17 NEXUS: CHAPMAN J. L. & POL’Y 135, 136 (2012). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Non-Economic Damages, supra note 7. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Scott DeVito & Andrew Jurs, An Overreaction to A Nonexistent Problem: Empirical 
Analysis of Tort Reform from the 1980s to 2000s, 3 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 62, 69 (2015). 
 15. Id. at 70–72. 
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per 1000 physicians have decreased significantly.16 From 1992 to 1996, the rate 
of paid medical malpractice claims per 1000 physicians was 20.1.17 From 1997 
to 2002, this same measurement was 17.5.18 This number again decreased from 
2003 to 2008 and 2009 to 2014, with 13.2 and 8.9, respectively.19  
“[T]he structure of noneconomic damage caps can vary greatly among 
states.”20 There are three common forms of noneconomic damage caps. The first 
is the hard cap, which sets the maximum amount of noneconomic damages a 
plaintiff can be awarded.21 Hard caps are adjusted yearly to account for 
inflation.22 The second is the flexible cap, which provides a tiered system of 
noneconomic damages depending on factors like the severity of the injury 
sustained.23 The third is the staggered cap, which varies depending on the type 
of defendant.24 For example, South Carolina implements a provider/facility 
stagger where noneconomic damages of a provider are set lower but the facility 
can be liable for a larger amount.25 
The jury, as the finder of fact, is given discretion to determine how much a 
plaintiff should be awarded depending on the circumstances of an individual 
case.26 Statutory noneconomic damage caps, however, require judges to reduce 
those damages awarded by the jury to an injured plaintiff that exceed the ceiling 
of the cap.27 “As of January 2018, about half of the states have enacted some 
variation of a cap on noneconomic damages while six states place a cap on total 
damages.”28 Several states have imposed caps which begin as low as $250,000.29  
 
 16. Adam C. Schaffer et al., Rates and Characteristics of Paid Malpractice Claims Among US 
Physicians by Specialty, 1992-2014, 177 JAMA INTERN. MED. 710, 710 (2017). 
 17. Id. at 712. 
 18. Id. at 714. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Zachary J. Cloutier, What Watts Forgot to Mention: Equal Protection Analysis of 
Missouri’s Noneconomic Damage Cap, 83 UMKC L. REV. 403, 415 (2014). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Cloutier, supra note 20, at 415; S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-32-220(C) (2012). 
 26. Fish, supra note 9, at 137. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Medical Liability Reform Now! 5 AM. MED. ASSOC. 14 (2018), https://www.ama-assn.org 
/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/premium/arc/mlr-now.pdf. 
 29. See W. McDonald Plosser, Sky’s the Limit? A 50-State Survey of Damages Caps and The 
Collateral Source Rule, MONDAQ (Dec. 11, 2018), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/76257 
4/Insurance/Skys+The+Limit+A+50State+Survey+Of+Damages+Caps+And+The+Collateral+ 
Source+Rule [https://perma.cc/AE2P-HDCL]; Medical Malpractice Damage Caps, MED. 
MALPRACTICE CTR., http://malpracticecenter.com/legal/damage-caps (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); 
Adam D. Glassman, The Imposition of Federal Caps in Medical Malpractice Liability Actions: Will 
They Cure the Current Crisis in Health Care?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 417, 431 n.61, 435 (2004). 
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Many have criticized the unfairness of these damage caps.30 In one landmark 
case, a healthy thirty-five-year-old mother of three was paralyzed and left 
severely brain damaged by a negligent surgeon.31 The jury returned a verdict of 
$2,750,000 against defendants, but that verdict was reduced by $2,000,000 to 
$750,000 in accordance with a Virginia damage cap statute.32 In another case, 
the estate of Kelly Smith brought an action against a hospital when it failed to 
stabilize Smith’s condition (an open femur fracture) before transporting him.33 
Following trial, the jury awarded Plaintiff $5 million in noneconomic damages, 
which was reduced by over $4.6 million to $359,000 in accordance with 
Michigan’s damages cap.34 Overall, noneconomic damage caps, on average, 
reduce malpractice awards by $42,980, or about a fifteen percent reduction.35  
II.  CONSTITUTIONALITY 
The Supreme Court has not made a definitive ruling on the constitutionality 
of damage caps, and state court decisions are across the board.36 Noneconomic 
damage caps have been struck down as unconstitutional in several states, 
including Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Missouri, New 
Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin.37 
In some states, including Illinois, Ohio, and Wisconsin, caps were struck down 
by the states’ supreme courts and later reenacted in an amended form.38 
Customarily, noneconomic damage caps are challenged on six grounds: (1) 
access to courts, (2) right to trial by jury, (3) due process, (4) separation of 
powers, (5) privileges and immunities, and (6) equal rights and opportunities.39 
Most recently, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that Kansas’s statutory cap on 
damages for noneconomic damages was unconstitutional on June 14, 2019.40 
 
 30. See DeVito & Jurs, supra note 14, at 73. 
 31. Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 525, 526–27 (Va. 1989). 
 32. Id. at 527. 
 33. Smith v. Botsford Gen. Hosp., 419 F.3d 513, 515 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 34. Id. at 515, 521. 
 35. Seth Seabury et al., Medical Malpractice Reform: Noneconomic Damages Caps Reduced 
Payments 15 Percent, With Varied Effects By Specialty, HEALTHAFFAIRS (Oct. 22, 
2014), available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4278571/ [https://perma.cc/G 
C6F-UXCX]. 
 36. Kevin J. Gfell, The Constitutional and Economic Implications of A National Cap on Non-
Economic Damages in Medical Malpractice Actions, 37 IND. L. REV. 773, 781 (2004). 
 37. Medical Liability Reform Now!, supra note 28, at 25. 
 38. Ronen Avraham & Álvaro Bustos, The Unexpected Effects of Caps on Non-Economic 
Damages, 30 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 291, 291–92 (2010). 
 39. Miller & Weidhaas, supra note 6, at 345; Ganske, supra note 6, at 33, 45; Fish, supra note 
9, at 142; J. Chase Bryan, Walter H. Boone & Jordan M. Mason, Are Non-Economic Caps 
Constitutional?, 80 DEF. COUNSEL J. 154, 155 (2013). 
 40. Debra Cassens Weiss, Cap on Pain-and-Suffering Damages Violates Kansas Constitution, 
State Supreme Court Says, ABA J. (June 18, 2019), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/caps-
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2020] BREAKING THE MYTHS 293 
This long-controversial topic has largely been avoided by federal courts. “A 
federal statutory cap on noneconomic damages in malpractice cases has never 
been enacted because of political disagreement over what constitutes a proper 
solution to the medical malpractice predicament.”41 
In 2011, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals weighed in on a 
constitutional discussion of noneconomic damages, but ultimately certified four 
of the constitutional arguments to the Supreme Court of Florida in Estate of 
McCall v. United States.42 The case involved a twenty-year-old woman who 
bled to death following a cesarean section during the birth of her son at a U.S. 
Air Force clinic in Florida.43 The trial court awarded noneconomic damages of 
$2 million, but the district court reduced the award to $1 million in accordance 
with the statutory cap.44 In 2014, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the 
noneconomic damage cap violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Florida 
Constitution.45 Although McCall addressed only wrongful death actions,46 the 
Supreme Court of Florida expanded this same reasoning to all medical 
negligence actions in 2017.47  
Recently, damages as a whole—economic, noneconomic, and punitive—
have come into the legal spotlight. Punitive damages are damages that are 
considered a punishment or deterrent and are typically awarded at the court’s 
discretion whenever a defendant’s behavior is especially reckless, wanton, or 
malicious.48 Punitive damages and noneconomic damages are closely related. In 
fact, some state statutes include punitive damages within noneconomic 
damages.49 While the United States Supreme Court has largely stayed out of the 
 
on-pain-and-suffering-damages-violate-kansas-constitution-state-supreme-court-says 
[https://perma.cc/J7AT-8CWM]. 
 41. Fish, supra note 9, at 138. 
 42. See Estate of McCall ex rel. McCall v. United States, 642 F.3d 944, 947 (11th Cir. 2011), 
certified question answered sub nom. Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So.3d 894, 897 (Fla. 
2014). 
 43. Pamela Sakowicz Menaker, Caps on Non-Economic Damages Held Unconstitutional, 
AM. BAR ASSOC. (June 2, 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/liti 
gation-news/top-stories/2014/caps-on-non-economic-damages-held-unconstitutional/ [https://per 
ma.cc/2ZGK-JYN8]. 
 44. Id. 
 45. McCall, 134 So.3d at 897. 
 46. Bianca Bishop, Year in Review (Case Law) June 2015–June 2016, 20160627 AHLA 
Seminar Papers 2 (June 27, 2016). 
 47. N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Kalitan, 174 So.3d 403, 413 (Fla.App. 2015), aff’d 219 So.3d 
49, 58 (Fla. 2017) (noting that so long as the caps discriminate between classes of medical 
malpractice victims, as they do in the personal injury context, they are rendered unconstitutional 
by McCall, notwithstanding the legislature’s intentions). 
 48. Punitive Damages, CORNELL L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/ 
wex/punitive_damages (last visited Feb. 24, 2019). 
 49. Kristine C. Karnezis, Validity of State Statutory Cap on Punitive Damages, 103 A.L.R.5th 
379 (2002). 
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non-economic debate, the Court recently decided a case regarding punitive 
damages. The Supreme Court denied punitive damages in unseaworthy claims, 
which is especially noteworthy because it was the first punitive damages case in 
which Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh participated 
in as members of the Court.50 However, because this case, at least on its face, is 
limited to the context of federal maritime law and its connection with 
seaworthiness claims, it is unclear what broader implications may follow.51 
Further, in 2018, in Lindenberg v. Jackson National Life Insurance, the 
Sixth Circuit held that a Tennessee statutory cap on punitive damages was 
unconstitutional because it violated the state’s right to trial by jury.52 This 
decision sparked an examination of whether appellate court panels should be 
deciding issues of first impression.53 In this case, U.S. Circuit Judge Eric Clay 
acknowledged the “lack of uniformity” among states regarding punitive damage 
caps.54 The majority held that “[s]uch an infringing reduction is not analogous 
to permissible legal consequences that impact a jury’s verdict.”55 As a result, the 
Sixth Circuit determined that punitive damages caps are unconstitutional.56 
However, this case also included a twenty-one page dissent by Judge Joan 
Larsen stating that this matter should have been decided by the Tennessee 
Supreme Court.57 The Sixth Circuit is unlikely to have the last word on this 
issue.58 The Tennessee Court of Appeals and ultimately the Tennessee Supreme 
Court eventually will step in.59 Until then, however, cases in federal court will 
now be governed by the two-judge decision in Lindenberg.60 As tort reformists 
 
 50. Evan M. Tager, Supreme Court Holds That Punitive Damages May Not Be Awarded in 
Connection With Unseaworthiness Claims, GUIDEPOSTS (June 26, 2019), https://www.punitive 
damagesblog.com/2019/06/supreme-court-holds-that-punitive-damages-may-not-be-awarded-in-
connection-with-unseaworthiness-claims/ [https://perma.cc/2YGF-6G92]. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Lindenberg v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 912 F.3d 348, 367 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 53. Miriam R. Nemetz & Evan M. Tager, Sixth Circuit Invalidates Tennessee’s Punitive-
Damages Cap And Holds That Punitive Damages are Available Under Tennessee Law For Bad-
Faith Denial of Insurance Benefits, MONDAQ (Jan. 30, 2019), http://www.mondaq.com/united 
states/x/776336/Insurance/Sixth+Circuit+Invalidates+Tennessees+PunitiveDamages+Cap+and+ 
Holds+That+Punitive+Damages+Are+Available+Under+Tennessee+Law+For+BadFaith+Denial
+Of+Insurance+Benefits?type=popular [https://perma.cc/J823-NDRU] (this appellate court panel 
consisted of three judges). 
 54. Lindenberg, 912 F.3d at 366–67. 
 55. Id. at 369. 
 56. Id. at 369–70. 
 57. Id. at 370. 
 58. Nemetz & Tager, supra note 53. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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commonly try to limit both punitive and noneconomic damages,61 these cases 
regarding punitive damages may also affect cases about noneconomic damages.  
Moreover, recent court decisions are bringing the discussion of effectiveness 
of noneconomic damage caps into their opinions when deciding cases. For 
example, in Klotz v. St. Anthony’s Medical Center, Judge Richard Teitelman of 
the Missouri Supreme Court wrote a separate concurring opinion to emphasize 
the effects of caps on noneconomic damages.62 In this case, the trial court 
reduced James Klotz’s award of noneconomic damages against the defendant 
hospital and physician from $509,200 to $234,500.63 Judge Teitelman’s 
concurrence highlights that noneconomic damage caps present disproportionate 
disadvantages to the most seriously injured people, young people, and 
economically disadvantaged people.64 He reasoned that these types of plaintiffs 
are disproportionately impacted by the “arbitrary limits on noneconomic 
damages.”65 Judge Teitelman emphasized that denying full compensation to the 
young and economically disadvantaged effectively extinguishes their claims.66 
Additionally, he acknowledged that, due to the money it takes to prove medical 
negligence, few lawyers, who often must work on a contingency fee basis, will 
take a medical negligence case on behalf of a poor person whose damages are 
disproportionately noneconomic.67 This concurrence concludes that caps on 
noneconomic damages act as “a padlock on the courthouse door.”68 
Additionally, in McCall’s plurality, the Supreme Court of Florida observed 
that other states’ supreme courts have also struck down noneconomic damage 
caps.69 According to the plurality, the Florida caps on noneconomic damages in 
wrongful death medical malpractice cases save “a modest amount for many by 
imposing devastating costs on a few—those who are most grievously injured, 
those who sustain the greatest damage and loss, and multiple claimants for 
whom judicially determined noneconomic damages are subject to division and 
reduction simply based upon the existence of the cap.”70 This language was also 
quoted by the Florida Supreme Court in 2017 in North Broward Hospital 
 
 61. Effect of Tort Reform on Personal Injury Cases, ALL LAW, https://www.alllaw.com/arti 
cles/nolo/personal-injury/effect-tort-reform.html [https://perma.cc/Y56E-CD74] (last visited Sept. 
14, 2019). 
 62. Klotz v. St. Anthony’s Med. Ctr., 311 S.W.3d 752, 782 (Mo. 2010), as modified (May 25, 
2010). 
 63. Id. at 759. 
 64. See id. at 782 (noting that economically disadvantaged people include poverty-stricken, 
the physically and mentally disabled, single mothers, wounded veterans, the elderly, and others). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Klotz, 311 S.W.3d at 782. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Ganske, supra note 6, at 46 (citing Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So.3d 894, 916 
(Fla. 2014)). 
 70. Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So.3d 894, 903 (Fla. 2014) (emphasis added). 
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District v. Kalitan.71 In Kalitan, the court held that statutory caps on personal 
injury noneconomic damages in medical negligence actions violated the Florida 
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.72  
Further, in 2017, the majority in Mayo v. Wisconsin Injured Patients 
discussed that the state’s noneconomic damage cap had little to no effect on 
physician retention in Wisconsin.73 The Mayo court also stated the noneconomic 
damage caps have “the practical effect of imposing devastating costs on the few 
who sustain the greatest damages and creates a class of catastrophically injured 
victims who are denied the adequate compensation awarded by a jury, while the 
less severely injured malpractice victims are awarded their full compensation.”74 
As a result, the court found the $750,000 noneconomic damage cap to be 
arbitrary and unsupported by the statutory goals.75 
This focus on the effects on noneconomic damage caps in recent court 
decisions involves the larger debate that will likely be the center of upcoming 
decisions regarding noneconomic damage caps. This author, like the Mayo 
majority, suggests that noneconomic damage caps present more disadvantages 
than benefits and do not achieve the goals they were set forth to accomplish. 
III.  EFFECTS OF NONECONOMIC DAMAGE CAPS 
A. Effect on Physician Insurance Premiums 
As mentioned above, one purpose of damage caps is to reduce medical 
malpractice insurance premiums for physicians.76 When noneconomic caps 
began, many physicians faced exorbitant medical malpractice liability insurance 
premium increases, as much as 100 percent or 200 percent more than previous 
years.77 Some physicians were dropped by their insurers and forced to select 
other insurers, practice without coverage, move to other states with lower 
medical malpractice insurance premiums, or give up medicine altogether.78 The 
hope was that noneconomic damage caps would alleviate some of the financial 
burden on physicians. 
 
 71. N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Kalitan, 219 So.3d 49, 57 (Fla. 2017). 
 72. Id. at 50. 
 73. Mayo v. Wis. Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 901 N.W.2d 782, 791 (Wis. App. 
2017). This decision was reversed in a 2018 holding that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages 
was not facially unconstitutional. Mayo v. Wis. Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 914 
N.W.2d 678, 684 (Wis. 2018). 
 74. Mayo, 901 N.W.2d at 794. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Adam D. Glassman, The Imposition of Federal Caps in Medical Malpractice Liability 
Actions: Will They Cure the Current Crisis in Health Care?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 417, 419 (2004). 
 77. Id. at 417. 
 78. Id. 
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However, noneconomic damage caps did not turn out to be the savior for the 
malpractice insurance crisis that many hoped they would be. The effects of the 
caps on physician insurance premiums are modest.79 In fact, data from the 
Americans for Insurance Reform concludes that limiting patients’ legal rights 
through damage caps do not result in lower premiums for the doctors and could 
suggest the opposite.80 A 2016 study found that, “[s]tates that enacted new limits 
on patients’ legal rights in medical malpractice cases (caps on damages plus 
other traditional tort reforms) saw an average 22.7 percent decrease in pure 
premiums from 2002 to the present—but states that did nothing saw a larger 
average drop of 29.5 percent.”81 Even more striking, when discussing only 
noneconomic damage caps and excluding other traditional tort reforms, states 
that enacted only caps on damages saw an average 21.8 percent decrease in pure 
premiums from 2002 to 2016.82 However, the states that did nothing saw an even 
greater average drop of 28.9 percent.83 
This trend is supported by data from several states. For example, Missouri, 
a “crisis state” identified by the American Medical Association, had a cap on 
noneconomic damages since 1986.84 In 2003, the Missouri Department of 
Insurance saw a drop of 14 percent in new medical malpractice insurance claims 
(a record low) and total payouts to medical malpractice lawsuits dropped 21 
percent from the previous year.85 This resulted in an approximate 30 percent 
reduction of total payouts since 1991.86 Paid claims against physicians fells 42.3 
percent during the same time period.87 Yet between 2000 and 2003, during a 
time where everything seemed to be going right for doctors’ insurance rates, the 
premiums rose by an astounding 121 percent.88  
 
 79. Michelle M. Mello, Medical Malpractice: Impact of the Crisis and Effect of State Tort 
Reforms, THE ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. 1 (May 2006), available at https://folio.iu 
pui.edu/bitstream/handle/10244/526/no10_researchreport.pdf. 
 80. J. Robert Hunter & Joanna Doroshow, Premium Deceit 2016: The Failure of “Tort 
Reform” to Cut Insurance Prices, AMERICANS FOR INS. REFORM 6 (Nov. 2016), http://cen 
terjd.org/system/files/MasterPremiumDeceit2016F3.pdf. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. “Caps” Do Not Lower Insurance Premiums For Doctors (and Insurance Insiders Admit 
It), CTR. FOR JUST. & DEMOCRACY (Apr. 12, 2011), https://www.centerjd.org/sites/default/files/ 
ckfinder/userfiles/files/CapsDontWorkF(1).pdf. This cap was struck down as unconstitutional in 
July 2012—twenty-six years after its enactment. Missouri’s non-economic damage cap is now 
$400,000. See Caps on Damages, AM. MED. ASSOC., https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn. 
org/files/corp/media-browser/premium/arc/caps-on-damages_0.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2020). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id.; Mo. Malpractice Claims Fall But Premiums Rise, INS. J. (Nov. 9, 2004), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/midwest/2004/11/09/47543.htm [https://perma.cc/N6YE-
K5TX]. 
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Even with new cap legislation, insurers are free to raise their prices—and 
they have. In Florida, political leaders vowed that a sweeping medical 
malpractice overhaul bill would “reduce ever-increasing insurance premiums for 
Florida’s physicians,” but insurers soon followed up with requests to increase 
premiums by as much as 45 percent.89 In Mississippi, four months after medical 
malpractice caps were passed, surgeons still could not find affordable insurance 
and many Mississippi doctors were still limiting their practices or walking off 
the job in protest.90 In Nevada, within weeks of enacting medical malpractice 
caps, insurance companies asserted they would not reduce insurance rates for 
another year or two, if ever.91 Then, three medical malpractice insurers in 
Nevada filed for sixteen, twenty-five, and ninety-three percent rate increases.92 
In Ohio, almost immediately after medical malpractice tort reform was passed, 
each major medical malpractice insurance company within the state announced 
they would not reduce their rates, with one company predicting the company 
would seek a 20 percent rate increase.93 In Oklahoma, after medical malpractice 
caps passed in 2003, a large insurer instituted a 20 percent raise in its premiums, 
followed by an extreme 105 percent rate hike in 2004.94 Further, just after tort 
reform passed, the state’s largest insurance company, owned by the state medical 
association, requested an astonishing 83 percent rate hike, which was approved 
with the condition it be phased in over three years.95 In Texas, tort reformists 
promised rate cuts if tort reform was passed, but after the referendum passed, 
major insurers requested rate hikes as high as 35 percent for doctors and 65 
percent for hospitals.96 When one insurance company was denied a rate increase, 
it announced it was using a legal loophole to avoid regulation and increase 
premiums without approval.97 “In a 2004 filing to the Texas Department of 
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Insurance, GE Medical Protective revealed that the state’s noneconomic damage 
cap would be responsible for no more than a 1 percent drop in losses.”98 In 
effect, insurance companies are profiting more, despite medical malpractice 
premium decreases.99 
The effects of these caps are modest because malpractice premiums can be 
a “convenient scapegoat for frustrated physicians.”100 While a physician may 
suspect malpractice premiums to be the culprit when their income does not grow, 
fails to keep up with inflation, or declines altogether, the problem lies 
elsewhere.101 Some pay cuts derive from health insurers clamping down on 
physician fees and denying payment for services that they deem unnecessary.102 
Some pay cuts are the result of changes in federal medical legislation.103 There 
are many factors that contribute to physician health insurance rates, yet many 
point the finger at injured patients and the families of deceased patients seeking 
damages for their losses.  
B. Effect on Public Insurance Premiums 
There is also underwhelming evidence that noneconomic damage caps 
reduce insurance premiums or even significantly affect insurance premiums for 
patients. A core policy argument used to support adoption of damage caps is that 
caps will reduce defensive medicine and, thus, reduce healthcare spending,104 
but this has not been the case. From 2003 to 2015, “the value of medical lawsuit 
malpractice payments declined by 22 percent.”105 “Meanwhile, national 
healthcare costs rose by over 80 percent.”106 
One independent study concluded that damage caps and increases in 
insurance rates are not related because “less than .6% of claims brought are for 
over $100,000.”107 Approximately $215 billion was collected in 2003 for 
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insurance premiums.108 Of this $215 billion, only $11 billion was attributable to 
medical negligence premiums.109 During the same year, “more than $1.5 trillion 
was spent on healthcare.”110 Costs constituting “less than 1% of healthcare costs 
could hardly have the impact that proponents of the medical malpractice myth 
claim.”111 A national study supported similar findings stating, “[c]ap supporters 
attribute medical malpractice claims to rising healthcare costs, but a national 
study showed that the direct cost of malpractice accounts for less than two 
percent of total national healthcare costs.”112 Another study concluded that in 
2015 (the most recent year where data was available), “medical malpractice 
payments on behalf of doctors amounted to about 0.2 percent of costs for 
hospital and physician services and about 0.1 percent of all healthcare costs.”113 
In over thirty years, medical malpractice premiums and claims have never been 
greater than one percent of our nation’s healthcare costs.114  
Thus, even a significant “reduction of 25 to 30 percent in malpractice costs 
would lower health care costs by only about [0].4 to 0.5 percent, and the likely 
effect on health insurance premiums would be comparably small.”115 The 
Congressional Budget Office found that even if the country enacted an entire 
menu of extreme tort restrictions it could only yield an extremely small 
percentage of health care savings, about 0.5%.116 “The small number and size of 
most awards is at odds with the argument that large medical malpractice damage 
verdicts are a major reason for the rise in healthcare costs or premiums.”117 
There is, at the least, no evidence that caps reduce healthcare spending.118 
C. The Real Winners of Noneconomic Damages 
The reduction in payouts has, instead, created record surpluses for insurance 
companies over the past few years, despite their claims of a litigation “crisis” 
 
 108. Kenneth C. Chessick & Matthew D. Robinson, Medical Negligence Litigation is Not the 
Problem, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 563, 570 (2006). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Miller & Weidhaas, supra note 6, at 350. 
 113. Lincoln, supra note 105, at 5. 
 114. J. Robert Hunter et al., True Risk: Medical Liability, Malpractice Insurance And Health 
Care, AMERICANS FOR INS. REFORM 2 (July 22, 2009), www.insurance-reform.org/studies/True 
RiskF.pdf. 
 115. Miller & Weidhaas, supra note 6, at 350. 
 116. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director of the Congressional Budget Office, to Orrin 
G. Hatch, United States Senator (Oct. 9, 2009) (available at http://www.cbo.gov/publication/413 
34). 
 117. Miller & Weidhaas, supra note 6, at 348. 
 118. Moghtaderi et al., supra note 104, at 28–29. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2020] BREAKING THE MYTHS 301 
causing higher premiums.119 The Americans for Insurance Reform (AIR) found 
that no matter how profits were measured, medical malpractice insurers were 
incredibly profitable, especially when compared to other sectors in the 
economy.120 In 2016, the medical professional liability insurance industry 
continued an unprecedented run of thirteen consecutive profitable years.121 In 
May of 2018, the U.S. medical professional liability insurance sector’s net 
income rose fifty percent, despite a second-straight year of underwriting 
losses.122 In fact, the average profit of the top ten medical malpractice insurance 
companies in 2008 was higher than ninety-nine percent of Fortune 500 
companies and thirty-five times higher than the Fortune 500 average for the 
same time period.123 Moreover, “insurance company profits are 24 percent 
higher in states with caps.”124 “[I]n states with caps, insurance companies took 
in 3.5 times what they paid out.”125 As a striking example, “California saw 
insurance rates increase over 450 percent in the 13 years after it passed MICRA, 
a severe cap on damages, and only saw rates go down in the wake of Proposition 
103, a set of insurance reforms that included mandatory rollbacks.”126  
While noneconomic damage caps on medical malpractice claims have 
become a major push for tort reform, they do not significantly lower insurance 
rates.127 Many insurance industry insiders acknowledge this and undermine any 
argument for noneconomic damage caps reducing premiums. For example, 
Victor Schwartz, General Counsel of the American Tort Reform Association 
stated, “[M]any tort reform advocates do not contend that restricting litigation 
will lower insurance rates, and I’ve never said that in 30 years.”128 Additionally, 
Robert Nagel, an Assistant Vice President of State Farm Insurance Company 
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(Kansas) stated, “[W]e believe the effect of tort reform on our book of business 
would be small . . . [T]he loss savings resulting from the non-economic cap will 
not exceed 1% of our total indemnity losses . . . .”129 Moreover, after Florida 
enacted “full-fledged tort reform,” including a noneconomic damage cap, Aetna 
Casualty and Insurance Co. (Florida) concluded the reforms would not affect 
Aetna’s rates.130 Yet noneconomic damages are still largely blamed for the 
soaring prices of insurance. 
In sum, when insurance companies pay out less, they keep more.131 Any 
“crisis” that exists is more likely the result of the cyclical nature of the 
economy.132 While patients see climbing insurance premiums, insurance 
companies are remaining extraordinarily profitable and are raking in any 
benefits of medical malpractice noneconomic caps.  
D. Fleeing Physicians 
“Physician labor supply has long-standing importance for access to and 
quality of healthcare delivered in the United States.”133 However, America is 
facing a possible physician shortage, with a predicted absence of up to 120,000 
physicians by 2030.134 A common argument in tort reform identifies one 
potential driver of physician shortages as physicians who may not want to 
practice in states that have unfavorable malpractice laws because they may be 
forced to pay higher malpractice premiums or may feel they are at higher risk 
for being sued.135 However, research does not reflect this trend, but rather, 
suggests the opposite. 
Noneconomic damage caps have little effect on the number of physicians 
practicing within a state. “Fears that doctors flee states lacking caps on medical 
malpractice noneconomic damages are unfounded.”136 The pre- and post-
Hyman Study reported in the Social Science Research Network concluded that 
although the raw number of physicians increased after caps were imposed, the 
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rate of increase in Texas of active, direct patient care physicians per capita was 
actually lower after caps were implemented.137 Likewise, the Mayo court 
concluded that Wisconsin’s damage cap did not help retain physicians.138 In a 
study of nineteen states, researchers found that even though one “might expect 
to see shifts in physician supply in the 2003–2006 period during which 
malpractice caps were being enacted, or shortly after, . . . we do not see any 
obvious visual evidence of this.”139 
The increasing physician shortage’s main cause lies within a growing, aging 
population and physician retirement, rather than with medical malpractice 
caps.140 “The combination of an aging patient population and an aging physician 
population is creating one of the underlying drivers of the growing physician 
shortage.”141 In a study of twenty-three major specialties, thirteen are comprised 
of forty-five percent or more physicians that are fifty-five years of age and 
older.142 Twenty-two percent of physicians aged fifty-six or older indicated they 
would retire in the next one to three years, while over nine percent of all 
physicians indicated they would retire in the next one to three years.143 
Moreover, doctors turning to retirement or leaving the field altogether 
typically do so for factors other than noneconomic damage caps. “Doctors are 
considering retirement as they feel the pressure of declining reimbursement, 
increased administrative burden, and industry consolidation.”144 In a survey 
studying physician work trends, poor work/life balance, stress, and inadequate 
compensation were top factors that would cause young physicians to consider 
searching for a new position.145 A 2016 study by the University at Albany 
School of Public Health concluded that only seven percent of respondents cited 
the cost of malpractice insurance as a reason for practicing outside of New York 
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State.146 Further, as in previous years, New York’s liability laws or legal 
environment were not even listed.147 As a result, “there is ‘no demonstrably 
consistent’ proof that doctors are likelier to continue practicing in states with 
damages caps.”148 In fact, data suggests some states with no noneconomic 
damage caps actually have higher retention rates.149 
E. Trickle Rather than Floodgate 
Some advocates for noneconomic damage caps claim that tort reform keeps 
out frivolous lawsuits.150 However, frivolous lawsuits seem to be another 
medical malpractice scapegoat. Harvard researchers concluded that “portraits of 
a malpractice system that [are] stricken with frivolous litigation are 
overblown.”151 This is a common perception by other academics, including 
eighty-five percent of judges, who do not believe frivolous suits are a serious 
problem.152  
“[T]here are far more cases of medical malpractice than medical malpractice 
litigation.”153 The Department of Insurance, Financial Institutions, and 
Professional Registration (DFIP) asserts that only a small percent of people 
harmed by medical malpractice make claims.154 In the United States, there are 
about ten incidents of medical malpractice for every one malpractice claim.155 
One “Harvard team looked at about 30,000 hospital records in New York and 
found conclusive evidence of a serious injury from medical malpractice in the 
records of 280 patients.”156 However, only eight of the 280 patients brought a 
claim.157 “That is less than three percent.”158 Similar findings occurred in Utah 
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and Colorado, where 15,000 hospital records indicated conclusive evidence of a 
serious injury from medical malpractice in the records of 161 patients.159 Only 
four of the 161 brought claims, which is also less than three percent.160 
Frivolous lawsuits are unlikely because bringing a meritless claim is 
expensive.161 Plaintiff’s lawyers typically work on contingency fees and 
advance expenses on their cases.162 Contingency fees allow many, who would 
otherwise be unable to pay an attorney, to see their day in court. “Expert 
witnesses can charge hundreds or even thousands of dollars per hour to review 
documents and testify during depositions and trials.”163 “It is not uncommon for 
an expert witness to spend a total of 20–30 hours on a case, between preparation 
time, travel, and in-court time.”164 Plaintiff’s attorneys using contingency fee 
arrangements bear this cost but take it out of a settlement if one is received.165 
As a result, plaintiff’s attorneys have little incentive to take on weak cases.166 
“Studies show that plaintiffs’ lawyers concentrating in medical malpractice 
routinely reject 80 percent or more of the requests for representation they 
receive.”167  
Another safeguard against frivolous lawsuits are affidavit of merit 
requirements.168 An affidavit of merit must be filed with the court following a 
petition and must include a written opinion of a qualified health provider 
maintaining that the standard of care was breached.169 In the United States, 
twenty-nine states have statutes that require an affidavit of merit in a medical 
malpractice claim.170  
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F. Difficulty Finding Representation 
While medical malpractice noneconomic damage caps do not affect 
frivolous lawsuits, they do affect those with rightful claims. Damage caps make 
it more difficult for attorneys to afford to take on legitimate cases, keeping in 
mind the cost of litigation.171 Damage caps and other tort reforms that artificially 
reduce plaintiffs’ damage awards also reduce contingent fee attorneys’ expected 
recoveries, resulting in fewer economically viable cases to accept.172 “Because 
of the complexity and expense of medical malpractice lawsuits, employing a 
lawyer is critical to a successful claim.”173 The high costs of medical malpractice 
investigation and litigation leave many malpractice victims without legal 
remedy.174 As a result, “many legitimate victims of medical malpractice have no 
meaningful access to the civil justice system.”175 Ninety-five percent of medical 
malpractice victims report having extreme difficulty finding legal 
representation, unless their damages are significantly larger than the typical 
damages for their types of injuries.176 This problem is worsening, as the 
economic realities continue to silence a growing number of victims.177  
This problem is highlighted in a recent investigative podcast, Dr. Death. Dr. 
Death investigates Dr. Christopher Duntsch, whose medical errors resulted in 
multiple deaths and catastrophic injuries to patients.178 Duntsch attended a 
reputable medical school, had glowing online reviews, and received no negative 
attention from the Texas Medical board.179 However his career quickly went 
south. He was likely one of the first, if not the first, doctor to be convicted of 
knowingly or intentionally injuring a patient.180 While this podcast is primarily 
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about a doctor’s extreme misconduct and the holes within medical malpractice 
reporting, it ends highlighting how medical malpractice caps in Texas left many 
severely injured patients without a remedy.181 
Barry Morguloff, one of Duntsch’s victims, recalls, “I could not find an 
attorney to save my life that would take the case. Come to find out, [in] the state 
of Texas, there are caps on malpractice and it is not worth an attorney’s time and 
energy to take on a malpractice case . . . .”182 Many of Duntsch’s victims 
experienced this difficulty.183 Attorney Mike Lions states how noneconomic 
damage caps can prohibit recovery, 
What I see day to day is people calling me saying “they killed my child—they 
killed my child in the ER” and now, what do we do? Well, what you do is you 
pray that you get pregnant again and have another baby because no lawyer is 
going to take that case. That child didn’t have a job, has no economic loss, your 
physical pain and suffering is capped at $250,000.184 
Moreover, those left without a legal remedy or little economic recovery are 
also the most vulnerable among us. Damage caps can disproportionately burden 
the most severely injured patients.185 The largest impacts in dollar terms from 
noneconomic damage cases were in pediatrics and obstetrics/gynecology, where 
average payments were reduced by over $100,000.186 Along with pregnant 
women and babies, noneconomic damage caps have disparate effect on elderly 
residents in nursing homes due to the general lack of meaningful economic 
damages among typical nursing home claimants.187 The elderly are especially 
vulnerable because many are not earning money and have very little to no 
potential to earn money in the future. Those with the least earning power are the 
most vulnerable.188 Even worse, these caps only affect the victims of malpractice 
who have suffered the most (or have the most damage-worthy injuries) because 
only those most seriously injured will have noneconomic damages that reach the 
limits of the caps.189 
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CONCLUSION 
The sharp divergence amongst the states of whether to have noneconomic 
damage caps has been present for decades. As seen, many states have upheld 
noneconomic damage caps while others have struck them down. Some never 
enacted the caps at all. Still, the federal courts and government have largely 
stayed out of the division.190 In effect, “pain and suffering” damage caps have 
little effect on healthcare costs but a major effect on legal rights of an injured 
patient. There is no proof that noneconomic damage caps actually make doctors’ 
insurance premiums lower or that they are a primary factor in many of the 
hurdles facing physicians today. Additionally, noneconomic damages do not 
significantly impact insurance rates for patients either.  
However, noneconomic damages do harshly influence those who are hurt 
the most by negligent doctors or medical staff. They also allow insurance 
companies to profit at patients’ expense. Noneconomic damage caps are not the 
answer to fixing health insurance premiums, but they are used as a scapegoat to 
avoid the true problems to the detriment of the most vulnerable Americans. The 
caps also bring up larger national issues: Should it matter which state the loss 
occurred in? Within a state, should it matter how many legally protected family 
members are left after a devastating loss?191 
However, there is still possibility for change. Plaintiffs’ bar members view 
recent decisions superseding noneconomic damage caps as long overdue and as 
indicative of a continuing trend.192 Brant Mittler, a cardiologist and attorney, 
warned about the effects of Texas limits on malpractice suits: “By giving 
damages to the individual, the jury is sending a message about safety to the 
doctors, the nurses, the hospital: ‘Please change your ways. Make health care 
safer  to  protect  all  of  us.’”193  Failing  to  hold the  medical  field accountable  
  
 
 190. Michael Matray, Are Federal Caps on Noneconomic Damages Possible Under a 
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 191. Ganske, supra note 6, at 50. 
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for their deadly mistakes will not protect the hundreds of thousands of patients 
that die from medical errors each year.194  
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